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To begin a postdoc with no prior training in a challenging field of  research is to embark 
on many intellectual trajectories. Where to begin?
This is the story of  two papers that I wrote,  early in my career, to understand Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem. I was trained in mathematics and physics where I  wrote my Ph.d 
dissertation in mathematical logic. My academic career in economics begins with my 
postdoc in mathematical economics at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, 
during the tenure of  Herb Scarf  as director. 
In the 45 years that we were colleagues on the economics faculty at Yale. Herb was the 
preeminent intellectual influence on my scholarship. One day, I went to his office to 
discuss  my current research on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, using the ultra-
filter construction from mathematical logic to “aggregate” models of  syntactic structures. 
After a few minutes of  my incoherent rambling he asked me the question that was to 
define my scholarship for the rest of  my academic life.
” First, what is the question that you are trying to answer  ? Let’s talk later about what 
methods you might use to find the answer” . “ What problem, relating to Arrow’s broad 
research agenda, are you trying to solve ?”
That was easy, like Arrow, I wanted to know:
If  the Condorcet voting paradox, where the presence of  voting cycles under majority 
rule, allows the social outcome to be solely determined by the voting agenda, is peculiar to 
majority rule or is it a fundamental characteristic of  every democratic voting rule?
 Here is the classic example of  the Condorcet’s voting paradox, first proposed by Condorcet 
(1785):
In Condorcet’s world there are three voters, A, B and C voting over three social alternatives, X,Y 
and Z. A ranks the alternatives as X , Y and Z; B ranks the alternatives as Y, Z and X. Finally, C 
ranks the alternatives as Z, X and Y. If  the voting rule is majority rule and the chair of  the 
committee choses the voting agenda, where she first lists the order for voting over pairs of  
alternatives in each round, where the winning alternative in the current round goes on to the next 
round to compete against the next alternative on the agenda. If  voters are non-strategic and vote 
their true preferences, then C the chairman of  the committee, will chose the agenda [X,Y,Z] , 
where the social outcome is Z, her preferred outcome. That is, in the first round of  voting A and 
C vote for X over Y, so X is the majority winner. In the second round of  voting the alternatives 
are X and Z. B and C vote for Z over X. Hence for this agenda, under majority rule, Z is the 
social outcome, the preferred outcome of  B, the chair. If  the chair was A, what voting agenda 
would he propose to have his preferred outcome be the social choice? 
There is another feature of   the Condorcet voting paradox. As is well known, economists define a 
rational voter as a voter endowed with a strict preference relation P where XPY can be interpret‐
ed as the voter votes for X over Y, if  given the choice between X and Y. The voter is also 
endowed with an indifference preference relation I, where XIY can be interpreted as X is not 
preferred to Y and Y is not preferred to X.The rationality assumptions are that both P and I are 
assumed to be transitive and that P is irreflexive, i.e. XPX is false for every alternative X. 
Individual rationality is not preserved under majority voting. In fact, Pm, the social preference 
relation defined by majority voting, is cyclic.That is, in the Condorcet voting paradox,YPmZ and 
ZPmX and XPmY. Hence YPmY, contradicting the assumption that Pm is irreflexive. Recall that 
Pm is transitive, if  for every triple of  social alternatives X,Y and Z: If  XPmY and YPmZ then 
XPmZ.
My insight was to argue that it is the lack of  acyclicity in the social preferences, Pm,  not the lack 
of  transitivity, that produces the Condorcet voting paradox in 1785 and subsequently is the root 
cause of  Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in 1951. Arrow like Condorcet had hoped that social 
preferences defined by voting preserved individual rationality. Is cycling of  the social preferences 
Pm for some profile of  individual preferences an important concern for small committees. YES, 
since it allows the chair of  the committee to manipulate the agenda and dictate the social 
outcome.
Hence we should require that the social preferences, Pm, defining the democratic voting rule to 
be acyclic for all profiles. That is, we need to characterize the democratic voting rules that 
preserve the acyclicity of  rational vote’s preferences. In Aggregation of  Preferences, I prove an 
Impossibility Theorem for acyclic voting rules inspired by the voting rule for the Security Council 
of  the United Nations prior to August 31,1965  that provides this characterization
Following the axiomatic methodology of  Von Neumann and Morgenstern in the Theory of  
Games and Economic Behavior (1944), Arrow proposed four axioms that he believed every 
democratic voting rule should satisfy: 
(1) Universal Domain: The democratic voting rule should aggregate every profile of  individual 
preferences into social preferences, Pm and Im, that are transitive and irreflexive.
Hence majority rule fails to satisfy Arrow’s first axiom, as demonstrated by the Condorcet voting 
paradox.
(2) Pareto Optimality: If  everyone votes for alternative X over Y in a pairwise choice between X 
and Y, then the social outcome is X.
(3) Independence of  Irrelevant Alternatives: In a pairwise choice between the social alternatives 
X and Y, the social outcome depends only on X and Y. That is, the social preference of  X versus 
Y depends only on the individual preferences of  X versus Y.
(4) Non-Dictatorship: If  only one voter prefers X to Y and everyone else prefers Y to X, then  the 
social outcome is Y.
To his surprise and I expect his dismay, Arrow proved the following remarkable result.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (1951) If  there are at least three social alternatives, then there are 
no voting rules that satisfy all four of  Arrow’s conditions. 
If  only the first three axioms are required to hold, then we have an important corollary of  the 
Impossibility Theorem, Arrow’s Possibility Theorem
Arrow’s Possibility Theorem: The only voting rule that satisfies Arrows first three axioms is 
dictatorial.
As might be expected, Arrow’s theorems inspired new fields of  research in the social 
sciences spanning economics, political science, and game theory.  
I shared a parking lot with Abraham Robinson,[1925-1965]one of  the great mathemati‐
cians of  the twentieth century, who formalized Leibinitz’s calculus of  infinitesimals, (1675) 
as an alternative to Newton’s calculus (1665-1666). Robinson’s model of  infinitesimals is 
exposited in his magnus opus, Nonstandard Analysis (1966). Robinson knew my back‐
ground in mathematical logic and asked if  I wanted to collaborate on using nonstandard 
analysis as a model for Edgeworth’s conjecture. 
 Edgeworth’s conjecture is that economic equilibrium resulting from bargaining in 
markets with large numbers of  economic agents is equivalent to economic equilibria 
realized by the invisible hand of  competition, introduced by Adam Smith in Wealth of  
Nations (1776). It was Herb, who urged me to drop my ongoing research on Arrow’s 
theorem and accept Robinson’s generous offer. 
His reason was simple. Robinson was a great man. He was and we wrote several pub‐
lished papers, that subsequently produced my first cohort of  Ph.D. students at Yale and 
jump-started my career as an academic economist.
 Later, another director of  Cowles, Bill Brainard, took me aside and told me that my 
tenure review would happen within the year, but my chances for tenure at Yale were not 
good. The issue was that despite my introduction, with Robinson, of  Nonstandard 
Analysis as a new and exciting tool in mathematical economics. All my publications were   
methodological, there was no substantive contribution to economics. 
Bill’s advice was to write a paper on some important issues in economics that the senior 
faculty could read and understand, without a Phd ina abstract mathematics. 
That is, no equations.
I used to play tennis with Bob Dahl. I confessed to Bob my ignorance of  the institutional 
aspects of  political power using voting and told him tht I wanted to define an abstract  
index of  the distribution of  the political power  between winning coalitions of  voters that 
might suggest a new and more intuitive proof  of  Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. 
Dahl  offered  to meet with me over lunch to tutor me on aspects of  democracy and 
voting. I learned quite a bit. 
What did I learn? In particular, after reading some of  the history of  the Roman Senate, 
suggested by Bob. I discovered that the Romans used the veto as their primary system of  
checks and balances on the political power of  the Roman Senate
 Maybe, I could use veto players to prevent voting cycles.  Bob and I did meet and I 
published without equations: Aggregation of  Preferences in the Quarterly Journal of  
Economics JE,1975, where veto players played an essential role in preventing voting 
cycles.Yes, I did get tenure.
Certainly, my best known publications in economics are in general equilibrium theory. 
See the selected articles listed in chronological order under references at the end of  the 
paper 
In the next section, I give a brief  summary of  the ideas and results in my paper: Aggregation of  
Preferences. In his classic essay, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), Arrow uses  a notion 
that is central to his proof. That is, decisive sets of  voters (or winning coalitions) defined by the 
voting rule:. Society prefers X over Y, iff  there is a decisive set that prefers X to Y. In the 
Condorcet voting paradox the decisive sets are each two voter majority and the coalition of  the 
whole. Here is the formal definition of  decisive sets.
DECISIVE SET: A subset, W, or coalition of  voters is decisive for a voting rule if  everyone in 
W prefers the social alternative X to Y then the social outcome is X. That is, each decisive set is 
an oligarchy. Any voting rule that satisfies the Pareto optimality axiom has at least one decisive 
set: The coalition of  the whole. Moreover, every superset of  a decisive set is a decisive set. My 
approach was inspired by the preservation theorems in model theory, a branch of  mathematical 
logic and one of  Robinson’s principal research interests.
HERE IS MY RESEARCH QUESTION. What is the structure of  the family of  decisive sets for 
democratic voting rules that preserve acyclicity of  individual voter’s preferences?
A filter, F, is an abstraction of  a family of  large subsets of  some universe U. That is, 
(1) U is in F 
(2) If  W and V are in F then W intersect V is in F 
(3) If  W in F and V is a superset of  W then V is in F. 
Finally, the empty set is not in F. 
Every family of  decisive sets defines a social welfare preference relation over the family of  social 
outcomes, where X is socially preferred to Y iff  a decisive set V prefers X to Y 
This construction need not generate rational individualistic preferences but if  the decisive sets 
form a filter then they do form an oligarchy. That is, the oligarchy is the smallest decisive set.  Of  
course, an oligarchy of  one is a dictator. An ultra filter F is a filter where for every subset of  voters 
W, either W or its complement is in F. The only ultra filters on a finite universe of  voters are 
dictatorial, i.e  there exists a decisive set with a single voter. Hence Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem on a finite universe proves that the family of  decisive sets for a democratic voting rule is 
a dictatorial ultra-filter. 
Fishburn (1970) observed that on an infinite universe the existence of  free ultra-filters, i.e., an 
ultra-filter, where the intersection of  all the decisive sets is the empty set, that there exists 
democratic voting rules that satisfy all four of  Arrow’s axioms. Hence Arrow’s possibility theorem 
on an infinite universe proves the family of  decisive sets for a democratic social welfare function 
on an infinite universe is a free ultra-filter.
Now for something new.. That is, my version of  Arrow’s Possibility Theorem using veto voters 
where I replace Arrow’s axioms with the following axioms: 
(1) Universal Domain: The voting rule maps profiles of  voters with acyclic preferences into an 
acyclic preference relation over the social alternatives
(2) Pareto Optimality
(3) Independence of  Irrelevant Alternatives
(4) Non-Dictatorship 
COLLEGIAL POLITIES
The decisive sets for voting rules satisfying this family of  axioms are defined as follows: If  there is 
a finite number of  voters then choose some proper subset of  voters, the colloquium, C, pick an 
integer K less than the number of  voters outside the collegium. The social alternative X is 
socially preferred to Y if  the collegium prefers X to Y,  and at least K voters outside the collegium 
prefers X to Y. Every member of  the collegium has a veto, but no member of  the collegium is a 
dictator.
This voting rule was inspired by the original voting rule in the U.N. Security Council and is 
acyclic, but the subsequent voting rule is not. Both voting rules and the principal contribution of  
my paper, Aggregation of  Preferences, that collegial polities preserve acyclicity of  voter’s 
individual preferences, are presented and discussed by Feldman and Serrano in their lucid 
monograph Welfare Economics and Social Choice (second edition). 
In Blau and Brown (1989), we extend the analysis of  preservation theorems in social choice 
theory, using families of  decisive sets, that I first introduced in my Aggregation of  Preferences 
paper. In our paper, the primitive notion is the family of  decisive sets and the voting rule is 
explicitly derived from the decisive sets. That is, if  the prescribed family of  decisive sets is Q, 
then in pairwise voting between social alternatives X and Y, X is socially preferred to Y, if  and 
only if  the set of  voters who prefer X to Y is a decisive set in Q. This is not the case in Arrow and 
more generally in the social choice literature, where the the primitive notion is the voting rule 
and decisive sets are derived from the voting rule. 
With the kind permission of  the Koerner Center at Yale and the journal of  Social Choice and 
Welfare, I close with, the abstract and preface to my paper with Julian in fond memory of  the end 
of  this intellectual trajectory.                  
                      The Structure of  Neutral Monotonic Social Functions 
                               by    Julian Blau and Donald J. Brown (1989)
Abstract: “  In this paper, we show that neutral monotonic social functions and their specializa‐
tions to social decision functions, quasi-transitive social decisions, and social welfare functions can 
be uniquely represented as a collection of  overlapping simple games, each of  which is defined on 
a finite set of  concerned individuals. Moreover, each simple game satisfies certain intersection 
conditions depending on the number of  social alternatives; the number individuals belonging to 
the concerned set under consideration; and the collective rationality assumption.” 
Preface: “ I first met Julian Blau at the 1977 Public Choice Meeting in New Orleans. As I 
recall he chaired the session where I presented earlier version of  what was to become the joint 
paper presented here.
At those same meetings, John Ferejohn and Peter Fishburn presented their joint paper on the 
representation of  social decision functions, possibly in the same session of  my paper .I remember 
several long walks with Julian where we discussed extensions of  my paper in the direction of  the 
Ferejohn and -Fishburn paper, but emphasizing the role of  neutrality, but the importance of  
neutrality in social choice theory had been a dominant theme in Julians earlier researches. 
[Neutrality means equal treatment of  alternatives.] 
It was during these conversations that our collaboration began Over the next year, we corre‐
sponded and talked over the phone. I am sorry now that I didn't save those letters. Julian was a 
perfectionist and we argued long and hard over definitions — he didn’t like the term direct sum 
of  games or the proofs. When the paper was essentially done, it was decided that I would send it 
off  for publication. Julian by that time was quite ill.
That was my last conversation with Julian. I submitted the paper to the Review of  Economic 
Studies and a year later received two excellent referees’ reports. By then I was actively at work on 
increasing returns to scale in general equilibrium theory and never got around to making the 
suggested revisions and sending it back to the Review of  Economic Studies. I am, therefore, quite 
pleased to have this opportunity to share with Julian’s friends and colleagues one of  his last 
contributions to his chosen field of  scholarship. 
EPILOGUE
The evening before my talk at the Koerner Center, I decided to review the discussion of  my 
paper Aggregation of  Preferences in the monograph on Welfare Economics and Social Choice 
by Feldman and Serrano, second edition. On the adjoining shelf  in the library was a text entitled: 
LIVES OF THE LAUREATES (5th edition), consisting of  autobiographical accounts of  the 
careers of  23 economists who had received the Nobel prize in Economics. Despite having the 
office next to Arrow’s during my 7 ear tenure at Stanford, we never discussed social choice or his 
Impossibility Theorem. So the evening before my talk, I read the chapter on Arrow. His memory 
of  the discovery of  his Impossibility Theorem differs significantly from the intellectual history of  
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem that I present here. In particular, he discovered Condorcet’s 
account of  the voting paradox well after he proved his Impossibility Theorem. Moreover, he 
learned that his Impossibility Theorem had been proven independently by the English economist 
Ducan Black more or less at the same time.You should read his essay.
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